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author | Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> | 2006-01-02 07:18:30 +0000 |
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committer | Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu> | 2006-01-02 07:18:30 +0000 |
commit | bee93bd060a7ed83db8a7f27e82ab35da4c7c01a (patch) | |
tree | 3b54f5fbe9ccf71ba1905db65716685dea07d78a /lib/chmod-safer.c | |
parent | 862fbc427b8b8a3444e8ab344a9c194ba02d49f7 (diff) | |
download | coreutils-bee93bd060a7ed83db8a7f27e82ab35da4c7c01a.tar.xz |
No longer used.
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/chmod-safer.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/chmod-safer.c | 131 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 131 deletions
diff --git a/lib/chmod-safer.c b/lib/chmod-safer.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3d0ec64f6..000000000 --- a/lib/chmod-safer.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,131 +0,0 @@ -/* like chmod(2), but safer, if possible - Copyright (C) 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - - This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) - any later version. - - This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - GNU General Public License for more details. - - You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, - Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA. */ - -/* written by Jim Meyering */ - -#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H -# include <config.h> -#endif - -#include "chmod-safer.h" - -#ifdef S_IFMT -# define defined_S_IFMT true -#else -# define defined_S_IFMT false -#endif - -#include "stat-macros.h" - -#include <stdbool.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <fcntl.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <unistd.h> - -#ifndef O_NOFOLLOW -# define O_NOFOLLOW 0 -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_FCHMOD -# define HAVE_FCHMOD false -# define fchmod(fd, mode) (-1) -#endif - -/* Return true if the file corresponding to stat buffer pointer ST is of type, - TYPE, and if its major and minor device numbers match (if appropriate: - when the type is S_IFIFO or S_IFBLK). */ -static inline bool -same_file_type (struct stat const *st, dev_t device, mode_t type) -{ - /* The types must always match. */ - if (! (defined_S_IFMT ? (st->st_mode & S_IFMT) == type - : type == S_IFDIR ? S_ISDIR (st->st_mode) - : type == S_IFIFO ? S_ISFIFO (st->st_mode) - : type == S_IFBLK ? S_ISBLK (st->st_mode) - : type == S_IFCHR ? S_ISCHR (st->st_mode) - : (abort (), false))) - return false; - - /* For character and block devices, the major and minor device - numbers must match, too. */ - if (S_ISBLK (type) || S_ISCHR (type)) - return st->st_rdev == device; - - return true; -} - -/* Assuming we can use open-with-O_NOFOLLOW and fchmod, set the permissions - of FILE to MODE, using fchmod -- but fail (setting errno to EACCES) if - anyone hard-links to FILE, replaces it with a symlink, or otherwise - changes its type. Return zero upon success. */ -static int -fchmod_new (char const *file, mode_t mode, dev_t device, mode_t file_type) -{ - int result = 0; - struct stat sb; - int fd = open (file, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK); - int saved_errno; - - if (fd < 0) - return -1; - - /* Given the entry we've just created, if its link count is - not 1 or its type/device has changed, then someone may be - trying to do something nasty. However, the risk of such an - attack is so low that it isn't worth a special diagnostic. - Simply skip the fchmod and set errno, so that the - code below reports the failure to set permissions. - Note that we don't check the link count if the expected - type is `directory'. */ - result = fstat (fd, &sb); - if (result == 0) - { - if ((sb.st_nlink == 1 || S_ISDIR (file_type)) - && same_file_type (&sb, device, file_type)) - result = fchmod (fd, mode); - else - { - errno = EACCES; - result = -1; - } - } - - saved_errno = errno; - close (fd); - errno = saved_errno; - return result; -} - -/* Use a safer variant of chmod, if the underlying system facilities permit. - This can avoid a minor race condition between when a file/device/directory - is created and when we set its permissions. If the system provides an - fchmod function and if its open syscall honors the O_NOFOLLOW flag, then - use open,fchmod,close. Otherwise, just call chmod. FILE and MODE are - just as for chmod. DEVICE is the combination (a la stat.st_rdev) of major - and minor device numbers. FILE_TYPE is one of the S_IF* values, e.g., - S_IFBLK, S_IFCHR, etc. */ -int -chmod_safer (char const *file, mode_t mode, dev_t device, mode_t file_type) -{ - /* Using open and fchmod is reliable only if open honors the O_NOFOLLOW - flag. Otherwise, an attacker could simply replace the just-created - entry with a symlink, and open would follow it blindly. */ - return (HAVE_FCHMOD && O_NOFOLLOW - ? fchmod_new (file, mode, device, file_type) - : chmod (file, mode)); -} |