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author | Jim Meyering <jim@meyering.net> | 2003-07-14 06:30:32 +0000 |
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committer | Jim Meyering <jim@meyering.net> | 2003-07-14 06:30:32 +0000 |
commit | e4c013c0f44df1183d0b47faccd1c5ea2a66eae0 (patch) | |
tree | 655c6f2411d8839b7711380944d334e967f81cae | |
parent | 3eecca631bbe4a09016807c87d1a2912708bdb04 (diff) | |
download | coreutils-e4c013c0f44df1183d0b47faccd1c5ea2a66eae0.tar.xz |
*** empty log message ***
-rw-r--r-- | NEWS | 20 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
@@ -5,16 +5,6 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*- - new program: `[' (much like `test') ** New features -- chown no longer tries to preserve set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits; - on some systems, the chown syscall resets those bits, and previous - versions of the chown command would call chmod to restore the original, - pre-chown(2) settings, but that behavior is problematic. - 1) There was a window whereby a malicious user, M, could subvert a - chown command run by some other user and operating on files in a - directory where M has write access. - 2) Before (and even now, on systems with chown(2) that doesn't reset - those bits), an unwary admin. could use chown unwittingly to create e.g., - a set-user-ID root copy of /bin/sh. - head now accepts --lines=-N (--bytes=-N) to print all but the N lines (bytes) at the end of the file - md5sum --check now accepts the output of the BSD md5sum program, e.g., @@ -25,6 +15,16 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*- on such a system, then it still accepts `.', by default. If chown was compiled on a POSIX 1003.1-2001 system, then you may enable the old behavior by setting _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 in your environment. +- chown no longer tries to preserve set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits; + on some systems, the chown syscall resets those bits, and previous + versions of the chown command would call chmod to restore the original, + pre-chown(2) settings, but that behavior is problematic. + 1) There was a window whereby a malicious user, M, could subvert a + chown command run by some other user and operating on files in a + directory where M has write access. + 2) Before (and even now, on systems with chown(2) that doesn't reset + those bits), an unwary admin. could use chown unwittingly to create e.g., + a set-user-ID root copy of /bin/sh. ** Bug fixes - chown --dereference no longer leaks a file descriptor per symlink processed |