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authorJim Meyering <jim@meyering.net>2003-07-14 06:30:32 +0000
committerJim Meyering <jim@meyering.net>2003-07-14 06:30:32 +0000
commite4c013c0f44df1183d0b47faccd1c5ea2a66eae0 (patch)
tree655c6f2411d8839b7711380944d334e967f81cae
parent3eecca631bbe4a09016807c87d1a2912708bdb04 (diff)
downloadcoreutils-e4c013c0f44df1183d0b47faccd1c5ea2a66eae0.tar.xz
*** empty log message ***
-rw-r--r--NEWS20
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 588da78db..668d6d24d 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,16 +5,6 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*-
- new program: `[' (much like `test')
** New features
-- chown no longer tries to preserve set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits;
- on some systems, the chown syscall resets those bits, and previous
- versions of the chown command would call chmod to restore the original,
- pre-chown(2) settings, but that behavior is problematic.
- 1) There was a window whereby a malicious user, M, could subvert a
- chown command run by some other user and operating on files in a
- directory where M has write access.
- 2) Before (and even now, on systems with chown(2) that doesn't reset
- those bits), an unwary admin. could use chown unwittingly to create e.g.,
- a set-user-ID root copy of /bin/sh.
- head now accepts --lines=-N (--bytes=-N) to print all but the
N lines (bytes) at the end of the file
- md5sum --check now accepts the output of the BSD md5sum program, e.g.,
@@ -25,6 +15,16 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*-
on such a system, then it still accepts `.', by default. If chown
was compiled on a POSIX 1003.1-2001 system, then you may enable the
old behavior by setting _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 in your environment.
+- chown no longer tries to preserve set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits;
+ on some systems, the chown syscall resets those bits, and previous
+ versions of the chown command would call chmod to restore the original,
+ pre-chown(2) settings, but that behavior is problematic.
+ 1) There was a window whereby a malicious user, M, could subvert a
+ chown command run by some other user and operating on files in a
+ directory where M has write access.
+ 2) Before (and even now, on systems with chown(2) that doesn't reset
+ those bits), an unwary admin. could use chown unwittingly to create e.g.,
+ a set-user-ID root copy of /bin/sh.
** Bug fixes
- chown --dereference no longer leaks a file descriptor per symlink processed